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Yogācāra Critiques of the Two Truths 
Zhihua Yao 
1   Introduction 
More than a decade ago, I went to Boston University to study Buddhist 
philosophy with M. David Eckel. In one of our first conversations, he said 
to me, “Madhyamaka is easy. On the level of the ultimate truth, you can 
say nothing. But on the level of the conventional truth, you can say any-
thing.”1  
Even if Madhyamaka can be put as simply as that, however, I have still 
had problems with it over the years. Why two truths? What could it 
mean for there to be two truths? Two different perspectives? Or two dif-
ferent realities? If the former, then the notion of two truths implies per-
spectivism. But in that case, why is truth limited to only two types? Why 
not three, or four, or more? If it is the latter, then it is even more trou-
blesome. Reality is reality; how can there be two different realities? And 
can both claim to be true?  
The Mādhyamikas seem to insist that “truth” (satya) here implies 
both perspective and reality. But this intertwinement between perspec-
tive and reality only makes things worse. It leads at least to this problem: 
to claim that there are two truths, in the perspectivist sense, is a way of 
evaluating or prioritizing different views or perspectives, and of passing 
judgment on right or wrong views, desirable or undesirable perspectives. 
In this sense, it might be possible for us to commit to a wrong view or 
perspective; but how can reality itself be wrong? 
-------------------------------------------------- 
1 In a recent conversation, he said that he would rather express the second alternative by 
saying, “At the level of the conventional truth, you can say something.” 
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Yijing (義淨, 635-713), a Chinese pilgrim to India in the seventh 
century, pinpointed the main difference between the two philosophical 
schools of Mahāyāna Buddhism. He said, “For Yogācāra, what pertains to 
the ultimate [level] exists, but what pertains to the conventional [level] 
does not exist; and [Yogācāra] takes the three natures as foundational. 
For Madhyamaka, what pertains to the ultimate [level] does not exist, 
but what pertains to the conventional [level] does exist; and it is in fact 
the two truths that are primary.”2 This suggests that if there were any 
key disagreements between these two schools, they should have to do 
with the two truths and the three natures. As Eckel (2008: 68) points out: 
“At its most basic level, the dispute between these two traditions (as it 
was formulated in the sixth century) can be understood as a conflict 
between these two interpretive principles: the Yogācāra doctrine of 
‘three natures’ versus the Madhyamaka doctrine of ‘two truths’.”  
On the Madhyamaka side, Bhāviveka, who is believed to be the first 
thinker who explicitly engaged in Madhyamaka-Yogācāra controversy, 
did fiercely attack the Yogācāra theory of the three natures in Chapter 5 
of his Madhyamakahṛdaya-kārikā and Tarkajvālā, and in Chapter 25 of his 
Prajñāpradīpa. The other major Yogācāra theory under attack was the 
doctrine of mind-only. It is only reasonable to assume that the Yogācāra 
side should have fired back, as turns out in fact to be the case with Dhar-
mapāla, who is believed to be responding to Bhāviveka’s criticism in the 
last chapter of his commentary to Āryadeva’s Catuḥśataka (see Keenan, 
1997). 
However, it has been a matter of debate among contemporary scho-
lars whether Bhāviveka, being a rather energetic critic of almost all Bud-
dhist and non-Buddhist philosophical schools of his time, started his at-
tack without warning, or was responding to some criticisms of Madhya-
maka that were initiated by the Yogācāras themselves.3 If the Yogācāras 
had ever criticized the Mādhyamikas before Bhāviveka, then the theory 
of the two truths would have been an obvious target; the other target, as 
I will show later, was the concept of emptiness.  
-------------------------------------------------- 
2 瑜伽則真有俗無，以三性為本。中觀乃真無俗有，寔二諦為先; T40:1817.783a29-b1. 
3 See Hanson, 1998 for a summary of the view that Bhāviveka initiated the controversy. 
For the opposite view, see Eckel, 1985; Eckel, 2008: 65-81. 
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In his recent study of the two truths in early Yogācāra, Lusthaus (2010) 
focuses on the writings of Asaṅga (and Maitreyanātha, if we follow the 
Chinese tradition of ascribing the encyclopedic Yogācārabhūmi to Maitre-
yanātha rather than Asaṅga). In this rather comprehensive survey of the 
writings of these founding masters of Yogācāra, however, Lusthaus says 
nothing about this conflict with the Mādhyamikas. Instead, he demon-
strates that the Yogācāras incorporated the two truths rather neatly into 
their more complex conceptual frameworks, where we can find para-
digms of one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, and ten truths. 
They even admit that “such distinctions can be extended without limit 
(apramāṇa)” (Lusthaus, 2010: 105).  
Is it really true that the early Yogācāras did not say anything negative 
about the two truths as understood by the Mādhyamikas? Is there any 
trace of Yogācāra-Madhyamaka controversy before Bhāviveka formally 
launched his criticism of Yogācāra? To answer these important questions, 
I turn to some texts of Maitreyanātha, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu that 
have escaped Lusthaus’s attention. 
2   Against nihilism 
First of all, a passage from the Tattvārtha Section of the Bodhisattvabhūmi, 
which is part of the Yogācārabhūmi ascribed to Maitreyanātha, holds 
great importance for the Madhyamaka-Yogācāra controversy. It was 
quoted indirectly in the Tarkajvālā 5.83ab by Bhāviveka, who thinks that 
“These angry words are like vomit, [which] shows the undigested pride 
[of the Yogācāras].”4 The original passage from the Yogācārabhūmi reads:  
Therefore, when some people hear the difficult and profound Mahā-
yāna sūtras that deal with emptiness and are considered to convey a 
meaning that needs to be interpreted, they do not discern the correct 
meaning of that which is spoken [in the sūtras]. They develop false 
concepts, and with mere logic (tarka) that is unreasonably performed, 
they come to have the following view and make the following state-
-------------------------------------------------- 
4 Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā 5.83cd: iti dveṣāmiṣodgāro ’bhimānājīrṇasūcakaḥ. See Eckel, 2008: 
282, 432. 
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ment: “All is nothing but a designation (prajñaptimātra), and that is re-
ality. Whoever sees it this way, sees correctly.” For these people there 
is no real thing itself (vastumātra) that serves as the basis of that de-
signation. [But] this means that there cannot be any designation at all. 
Moreover, how can reality be nothing but a designation? In this way, 
they end up denying (apodita)5 both designation and reality. Someone 
who denigrates (apavāda) designation and reality should be known as 
the worst kind of nihilist (nāstika). 
Since he is a nihilist, those who are wise and practice a religious 
life should not speak or share their living community with him. He 
causes himself to fall, and [causes] people who follow his views to fall 
as well.6 
This passage is one of the key pieces of evidence for Eckel’s (2008: 65-66) 
argument that there was a Yogācāra-Madhyamaka controversy before 
Bhāviveka. Putting aside the interesting historical and textual signifi-
cance of this short passage, let us focus on its philosophical implications.  
The thesis held by the Mahāyāna nihilists is formulated thus: “All is 
nothing but a designation, and that is reality” (prajñaptimātram eva sar-
vam etac ca tattvaṃ). This statement echoes Nāgārjuna’s famous verse in 
the Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā 24.18: “We state that whatever is dependent 
arising, that is emptiness, it [emptiness] is a dependent designation (pra-
jñapti), [and] it itself is the middle way.”7 However, the Mādhyamikas 
-------------------------------------------------- 
5 The Chinese translation bang (謗) and the Tibetan translation skur ba btab pa support 
the alternative reading apavāditaṃ, suggested by the Wogihara (1930-1936: 46) and Dutt 
(1978: 31) editions of the text. 
6 The Sanskrit edition of the text is based on Takahashi, 2005: 99-100: ato ya ekatyā durvi-
jñeyān sūtrāntān mahāyānapratisaṃyuktāṃ gambhīrāṃ śūnyatāpratisaṃyuktān ābhiprāyikār-
thanirūpitāṃ śrutvā yathābhūtaṃ bhāṣitasyārtham avijñāyāyoniśo vikalpayitvāyogavihitena 
tarkamātrakeṇaivaṃdṛṣṭayo bhavanty evaṃvādinaḥ prajñaptimātram eva sarvam etac ca tat-
tvaṃ yaś caivaṃ paśyati sa samyak paśyatīti teṣāṃ prajñaptyadhiṣṭhānasya vastumātrasyābhā-
vāt saiva prajñaptiḥ sarveṇa sarvaṃ na bhavati || kutaḥ punaḥ prajñaptimātraṃ tattvaṃ bha-
viṣyati || tad anena paryāyeṇa tais tattvam api prajñaptir api tadubhayam apoditaṃ bhavati || 
prajñaptitattvāpavādāc ca pradhāno nāstiko veditavyaḥ || sa evan nāstikaḥ sann akathyo bha-
vaty asaṃvāsyo bhavati vijñānāṃ sabrahmacāriṇām || sa ātmānam api vipādayati | lokam api 
yo ’sya dṛṣṭyanumatam āpadyate. 
7 Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 24.18: yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ śūnyatāṃ tāṃ pracakṣmahe | sā 
prajñaptir upādāya pratipat saiva madhyamā, see La Vallée Poussin, 1913: 503. 
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themselves did not normally describe their view of reality in terms of 
“nothing but a designation” or “designation-only” (prajñaptimātra). In-
stead, they were fond of two other key terms, i.e., “emptiness” (śūnyatā) 
and “the middle way” (madhyama); therefore, they were known as 
Śūnyavāda or Madhyamaka. But as shown in Nāgārjuna’s statement, “de-
signation” is a concept as fundamental as “emptiness” and “the middle 
way” to the Mādhyamikas.  
The Yogācāras seem less upset when Madhyamakas couch their 
claims in terms of “emptiness” and “the middle way”, as the Yogācāras 
have their own way of using these terms that eventually asserts the 
existence of consciousness (see further below). However, they are very 
critical of the notion that “all is nothing but a designation”. The reason 
for this criticism is a foundationalist dogma inherited from the Abhi-
dharma tradition: there has to be some real thing (vastu) that can serve 
as the basis of the designation. For instance, both the Yogācāras and the 
Ābhidharmikas would agree with the Mādhyamikas in regarding a “per-
son” as a designation. They would further hold that a person is designa-
ted on the basis of real dharmas, which, in the current case, include all 
the five aggregates, namely, form, feeling, conception, volition, and con-
sciousness. But the Mādhyamikas would plainly deny this. They see the 
five aggregates as just as unreal as a person; therefore, all of reality is 
only a designation. For the Yogācāras, by contrast, this would mean the 
denial of real things, and therefore the denial of reality itself. In terms of 
their own position, as the Yogācāras are committed to foundationalism, 
if there is no real thing to serve as the basis of designation, then there 
cannot be any designation at all. In this way, the Mādhyamikas also have 
to deny designation itself. By holding that “All is nothing but a designa-
tion,” the Mādhyamikas are led into a paradoxical situation in which 
both designation and reality are denied.  
3   The nihilists’s two truths 
In the Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī Section of the Yogācārabhūmi, another pas-
sage is devoted to arguing against the Mahāyāna nihilists. In his com-
mentary on the Yogācārabhūmi, Dunnyun (遁倫, d.u., alias Doryun 道倫), 
quoting contemporaneous Yogācāra scholars of the Tang Dynasty, iden-
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tifies this passage as a hypothetical dispute between Maitreyanātha and 
Bhāviveka et al.8 This time it focuses on their theory of the two truths, 
which is here formulated in a similar way as in Yijing: “Some nihilists in 
the Mahāyāna9 hold that [seen] from the [standpoint of the] conven-
tional [truth], all things exist; [seen] from the [standpoint of the] ulti-
mate [truth],10 nothing exists.”11 The proponent further requests clarifi-
cation of the two truths, and proposes a hypothetical answer for the op-
ponent as follows:  
If they [i.e., nihilists] would answer: The fact that all dharmas are de-
void of intrinsic nature (svabhāva) is called the ultimate [truth]. The 
fact that intrinsic nature can be apprehended within these dharmas 
that are [thus] devoid of intrinsic nature is called the conventional 
[truth].12 Why? Because conventions (shisu 世俗, kun rdzob, *saṃvṛti), 
designation (jiashe 假設, ’dogs pa, *prajñapti), linguistic expressions 
(mingyan 名言, mngon par brjod pa, *abhilāpa), and verbal conventions 
(shuo 說, tha snyad, *vyavahāra) are imposed on nonexistents.13 
-------------------------------------------------- 
8 “This [object of critique] is the views held by Bhāviveka et al., who are refuted by 
Maitreyanātha” (此是清辨等計，被慈氏所破; T42:1828.770c17) 
9 Literally, those among the Mahāyāna who understand emptiness wrongly (e qu kong 惡
取空, durgṛhītā śūnyatā, stong pa nyid la log par zin pa). Its Sanskrit equivalent is attested 
in the Yogācārabhūmi cited in n. 33 below. The Tibetan translation reads differently: theg 
pa chen po pa la la rang gi nyes pa gzung nas, which suggests a meaning similar to Para-
mārtha’s rendering of “some Mahāyānas who are attached to [their own] wrong views” 
(大乘中學有偏執者) in his translation of the same passage in the *Buddhadhātu-śāstra 
(Foxing lun 佛性論) (T31:1610.793c8, see Part 4 below for more discussion).  
10 I supply “truth” on the basis of Paramārtha’s renderings: “conventional truth” (sudi 
俗諦) and “ultimate truth” (zhendi 真諦) (T31:1610.793c9). 
11 復次於大乘中，或有一類，惡取空故，作如是言：由世俗故，一切皆有；由勝義故，
一切皆無, T30:1579.713b2-4; theg pa chen po pa la la rang gi nyes ba gzung* nas ’di skad ces 
kun rdzob tu ni thams cad yod la | don dam par ni thams cad med do zhes zer ro, D4038: zi 
42b5-6 (*nye bar bzung D; nyes pa gzung Q). 
12 Paramārtha renders “the conventional truth” (sudi 俗諦) (T31:1610.793c12), while the 
Tibetan translation reads kun rdzob (conventions). 
13 彼若答言：若一切法皆無自性，是名勝義；若於諸法無自性中，自性可得，是名世
俗。何以故？無所有中建立世俗、假設、名言而起說故, T30:1579.713b5-8; gal te de ’di 
skad ces chos thams cad kyi ngo bo nyid med pa gang yin pa de ni don dam pa yin la | ngo bo 
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As we see, the latter formulation is more in line with the terms of 
Madhyamaka itself. Viewed from the perspective of the ultimate truth, 
all dharmas are devoid of intrinsic nature, and therefore they are empty. 
This emptiness is in turn understood by their Yogācāra opponent to 
mean that “nothing exists” (yiqie jie wu 一切皆無, thams cad med). Those 
who are sympathetic to the Madhyamaka position may find this charac-
terization inaccurate. But as I have argued elsewhere (Yao, 2010: 84-85), 
although Nāgārjuna and his followers were not willing to commit to this 
position, their view of emptiness eventually leads to this nihilist end.  
The two parties do not exchange too much fire over the ultimate 
truth. Instead, they argue more extensively about the conventional truth. 
The Yogācāra again asks of designation by means of linguistic conven-
tions: “Do you mean to say that linguistic expressions and conventions 
arise from a causal relation, and intrinsic nature can be apprehended 
therein; or that they are merely linguistic expressions and conven-
tions?”14 In his commentary, Dunnyun quotes another Yogācāra scholar 
of the Tang Dynasty named Huijing (慧景, d.u.) to explain the implica-
tions of this question. If conventional existents arise from material or 
mental elements (dharmas) that are dependent in nature (paratantra-‌sva-
bhāva), then they are in a causal relation and have an identity or intrin-
sic nature (svabhāva). On the other hand, if conventional existents are 
merely words, that means that they arise without a cause and are not 
bound by a causal relation (see T42:1828.770b22-24).  
If the Mahāyāna nihilist holds to the former alternative, that is, that 
linguistic conventions arise from a causal relation, then the Yogācāra 
would say, “If linguistic expressions and conventions arise from a causal 
relation, then it is unreasonable to regard [such] linguistic expressions 
-------------------------------------------------- 
nyid med pa’i chos de dag la ngo bo nyid du dmigs pa gang yin pa de ni kun rdzob yin no || de 
ci’i phyir zhe na | ’di ltar de ni yod pa ma yin pa dag la kun rdzob tu byed pa dang | ’dogs pa 
dang | mngon par brjod pa dang | tha snyad du byed pa’i phyir ro zhes lan ’debs par gyur na, 
D4038: zi 42b6-7. To help make sense of Xuanzang’s obscure translation of the final 
sentence, I have followed the Tibetan translation. 
14 汝何所欲？名言、世俗為從因有，自性可得？為唯名言、世俗說有？ T30:1579.713
b8-10; ci ngo bo nyid du dmigs pa de mngon par brjod pa dang kun rdzob kyi rgyu las byung ba 
yin par ’dod dam | ’on te mngon par brjod pa dang | kun rdzob tsam zhig yin par ’dod, D4038: zi 
42b7-a1. 
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and conventions, which arise from a causal relation, as nonexistents.”15 
The Mādhyamika might refer to Nāgārjuna’s foundational verse 24.18 in 
the Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā (already cited above): “We state that what-
ever is dependent arising, that is emptiness;” and argue that even that 
which causally arises can be empty. The Yogācāra would further ask 
whether that which causally arises is an existent or a nonexistent. If it is 
a nonexistent, then absolute nonexistents, such as the hair of a turtle or 
the horn of a rabbit, would also arise from a causal relation. But this is 
certainly absurd. If that which causally arises is an existent, on the other 
hand, then it is an existent dharma, and cannot be empty or nonexistent.  
Dunnyun again explains the dispute in the explicitly Yogācāra terms 
of the three natures: “Any dharma that arises causally is dependent [in 
nature, *paratantra]. There is in a dependent dharma neither the deter-
minacy nor the nature of spontaneous arising, and therefore [Nāgārjuna] 
says: ‘We state that [whatever is dependent arising], that is emptiness.’”16 
Here, Dunnyun interprets that which causally arises in terms of the de-
pendent nature, and he also gives a Yogācāra account of “emptiness” by 
reference to the “non-arising-ness” (utpatti-niḥsvabhāvatā) of the depen-
dent nature, one of the “three naturelessnesses” (triniḥsvabhāva). 
If the Mādhyamika holds to the latter alternative, namely, that lin-
guistic conventions are merely words, the Yogācāra would say that “It is 
unreasonable that linguistic expressions and conventions should exist 
without a real thing (vastu) [as their basis (gzhi)].”17 This objection ech-
oes the passage from the Tattvārtha Section of the Bodhisattvabhūmi that 
we discussed earlier. The rationale is that any linguistic convention or 
designation has to be based on something real (vastu). Now, if linguistic 
-------------------------------------------------- 
15 若名言、世俗從因有者，名言、世俗從因而生，而非是有，不應道理, T30:1579.713
b10-11; gal te mngon par brjod pa dang | kun rdzob kyi rgyu las byung ba yin na ni des na 
mngon par brjod pa dang | kun rdzob kyi rgyu las byung ba yin pas yod pa ma yin pa zhes byar 
mi rung ngo, D4038: zi 43a1-2. 
16 因緣生法者，即是依他。依他法上無決定無自然生性，故云「我說即是空」 , 
T42:1828.770c1-3. 我說即是空 = śūnyatāṃ tāṃ pracakṣmahe, i.e. MMK 24.18b (cited 
above n. 7). 
17 名言世俗無事而有，不應道理, T30:1579.713b12; des na gzhi med par mngon par brjod pa 
dang | kun rdzob ces byar mi rung ngo, D4038: zi 43a2. The Tibetan translation reads alter-
natively: “without [a real thing as] their basis” (gzhi med par). 
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conventions are merely words and bear no causal relations, then no 
dharma can arise from causal relations. But these dharmas are exactly the 
real things that would serve as the basis of linguistic conventions and 
designations. 
The Yogācāra then puts forward a second question, regarding an epis-
temological issue: “Venerables, why is it that knowables (zhu kede zhe 諸
可得者, gang dmigs pa) are devoid of intrinsic nature?”18 In other words, 
if things are knowable, then they should not be nonexistent or empty. 
The Mādhyamika opponent hypothetically answers: “Because of the per-
verted view [that there are] real things (vastu).”19 According to the Bud-
dhist teachings, sentient beings are always perverse, owing to their igno-
rance. It is this perversion that contributes to our attachment to notions 
of self, permanence, and happiness, with regard to a reality that is in fact 
without self, impermanent, and characterized by suffering. So the Mā-
dhyamika is saying that things are in reality empty and devoid of intrin-
sic nature, but because of our perversion, they are known as something, 
or are something knowable. 
The Yogācāra goes on to ask, in the same manner as for designation, 
“Do you mean to say that this perversion (phyin ci log)20 is existent, or 
that it is nonexistent?”21 As in the earlier case of linguistic expressions 
and conventions, the Yogācāra again forces the Mādhyamika into a di-
lemma, and thereby claims victory over his opponent. If the Mādhya-
mika says that perversion is existent, “then it is unreasonable to say that 
all dharmas are devoid of intrinsic nature in the sense of the ultimate 
-------------------------------------------------- 
18 (又應告言)：長老！何緣諸可得者，此無自性? T30:1579.713b12-14; (de la ’di skad ces) 
tshe dang ldan pa ci’i phyir na gang dmigs pa de med pa yin zhes kyang (brjod par bya’o) 
D4038: zi 43a2-3. The Tibetan translation omits “of intrinsic nature”. 
19 (彼若答言)：顛倒事故, T30:1579.713b14; (gal te de ’di skad ces) phyin ci log gi dngos po yin 
pa’i phyir ro zhes (lan ’debs par gyur na), D4038: zi 43a3. 
20 Xuanzang’s translation reads: “this perverted view of real things”. The simpler “this 
perversion” is supported by the Tibetan translation and Paramārtha’s rendering (T31:
1610.‌793c19). 
21 汝何所欲？此顛倒事，為有？為無？ T30:1579.713b14-15; ci phyin ci log de yod par ’dod 
dam ’on te med par ’dod, D4038: zi 43a3. 
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[truth]”.22 This is because if perversion is admitted to be an existent 
thing, then all causally-based dharmas would also be existent, and it 
would be self-contradictory to say that they are ultimately empty or 
nonexistent. Note that the Yogācāra here does not embrace the two-
tiered perspectivist analysis of the conventional and the ultimate, as 
adopted by the Mādhyamika. Instead, by “ultimate” or “ultimately” the 
Yogācāra usually means the Abhidharmic sense of “analyzing things to 
their ultimate end”.  
If the Mādhyamika holds to the other horn of the dilemma, namely, 
that perversion is nonexistent, “then it is unreasonable [to say] that be-
cause of the perverted view of real things, these knowables are devoid of 
intrinsic nature”.23 This again calls for an epistemological consideration 
of the question of whether nonexistents can be knowable. In this context, 
the Yogācāra seems to hold that nonexistents cannot be knowable. For 
him, if perversion is nonexistent, then it should be as inapprehensible as 
the horn of a rabbit, a standard example of something that absolutely 
does not exist. This position is stated more explicitly in Dunnyun’s com-
mentary: “If the perverted view of real things is absolutely nonexistent, 
then it should be as inapprehensible as the horn of a rabbit. Now it is evi-
dent that [perversion] can be apprehended, so it is unreasonable to say 
that it is nonexistent.”24 Note, however, that as I have discussed else-
where, a variety of Yogācāra arguments do claim that it is possible to 
cognize nonexistent objects (Yao, 2014). For the present, I have no idea 
how to make sense of this discrepancy.  
-------------------------------------------------- 
22 (若言有者)，說一切法、由勝義故、皆無自性，不應道理, T30:1579.713b15-16; (gal te 
yod na ni) des na chos thams cad kyi ngo bo nyid med pa nyid ni don dam pa’o zhes byar mi 
rung ngo, D4038: zi 43a3-4.  
23 (若言無者)，顛倒事故，諸可得者此無自性，不應道理, T30:1579.713b17-18; (gal te med 
na ni) des na phyin ci log gi dngos po yin pa’i phyir gang dmigs pa de ngo bo nyid med do zhes 
byar mi rung ngo, D4038: zi 43a4. 
24 若顛倒事畢竟無者，應不可得，猶如兔角。今現可得而言無者，不應道理, T42:1828.
‌770c15-17. 
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4   The two truths and the three natures 
The passage from the Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī Section of the Yogācārabhūmi 
that we have just discussed is quoted in its entirety in the *Buddhadhātu-
śāstra (Foxing lun 佛性論 T1610), a work ascribed to Vasubandhu and 
translated into Chinese by Paramārtha (Zhendi 真諦, 499-569) between 
557 and 569.25 Compared to its original form in the Yogācārabhūmi, this 
quotation features a number of important variations. First of all, as we 
have seen, the target of the criticism is identified as “some Mahāyānas 
who are attached to [their own] wrong views” (dasheng zhong xue you 
pianzhi zhe 大乘中學有偏執者, T31:1610.793c8; see n. 9 above), rather 
than explicitly as “Mahāyāna nihilists”. This expression of Paramārtha’s 
is supported by the Tibetan translations: “some Mahāyānas who grasp 
their own wrong views” (theg pa chen po pa la la rang gi nyes pa gzung nas; 
see n. 11 above). Nonetheless, we can safely assume that the opponents 
are the Mādhyamikas. 
In the first set of arguments, i.e., about whether linguistic conven-
tions and designations exist or not, Vasubandhu’s recension is barely in-
telligible to me. Maybe the translation is corrupt, and we should simply 
follow the clearer expression in the Yogācārabhūmi.  
However, in the introduction to the second set of arguments, i.e., 
about whether perversion exists or not, Vasubandhu’s recension seems a 
bit clearer. He says: “Again, you state that there is a designation of in-
trinsic nature on the basis of that which lacks intrinsic nature; this is 
called conventional [truth]. [But] if the designation exists, how could it 
be nonexistent?”26 In his answer, Vasubandhu gives some further details 
that are not found in the Yogācārabhūmi:  
Answer: Because of perversion, one designates existents on the basis 
of nonexistents, [or] permanence and other such qualities on the ba-
sis of dharmas that are impermanent, suffering and without self. 
-------------------------------------------------- 
25 Some scholars have questioned the ascription of this text to Vasubandhu, but, as I 
have explained elsewhere (Yao 2005: 127), I follow Takemura (1977: 36-38) and others 
in insisting on the traditional attribution to Vasubandhu. 
26 又若汝謂於無自性中，執有自性，是名為俗。若執有者，云何是無？ T31:1610.793
c17-18. 
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Those [things which are designated] actually do not exist, and they 
are only considered existents provisionally. Such a designation is part 
of the four perversions. Therefore, although the designation exists, 
what is designated does not.27  
Subsequently, the two horns of the dilemma are also formulated in a 
slightly clearer way:  
Question: Does perversion exist or not? If it does, then it contradicts 
[your view] that all dharmas are devoid of intrinsic nature. If it does 
not, then designation cannot be considered a perversion, and it is 
wrong to hold that the conventional truth is a designation of intrinsic 
nature where there is [in fact] no intrinsic nature.28  
After this long quotation, we come to Vasubandhu’s own rather sophisti-
cated remarks:  
Why [does the text give the above criticism of the two truths]? We 
can say neither that the two truths exist, nor that they do not exist, 
because they are neither existent nor nonexistent. As for the fact that 
we cannot say that the ultimate truth exists or does not exist: 1) we 
cannot say that [the ultimate truth] exists, because there are no per-
sons or dharmas; [but] 2) we cannot say that [the ultimate truth] does 
not exist, because of the demonstration of the emptiness of the two 
[i.e., persons and dharmas]. The same is true of the conventional truth. 
Because of its imagined nature, we cannot say that [the conventional 
truth] exists. Because of its dependent nature, we cannot say that it 
does not exist. Moreover, the ultimate truth is not definitely existent 
or nonexistent. Persons and dharmas do not exist, and yet they are not 
nonexistents. The emptiness of the two [i.e., persons and dharmas] ex-
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truth. It is not definitely nonexistent because of its imagined nature. 
Nor is it definitely existent because of its dependent nature.29 
These remarks of Vasubandhu’s are probably the very first attempt on 
the Yogācāra side to incorporate the two truths into their more compli-
cated structure of the three natures. Based on these remarks, we can 
draw the following diagram:  
 
 emptiness of persons & dharmas —existent(?) 
 ultimate truth  
 no persons or dharmas  —nonexistent(?) 
  
 dependent nature   —existent(?) 
conventional truth 
 imagined nature   —nonexistent(?) 
 
As we see, the conventional truth is described as having two aspects. 
Viewed as the imagined nature (parikalpita-svabhāva), it does not exist; 
while viewed as the dependent nature (paratantra-svabhāva), it does exist. 
So conventional reality cannot be one-sidedly taken as purely imaginary 
or illusory; this would be to fall into nihilism. Nor can conventional real-
ity be taken as utterly existent, on the other hand, because the imagined 
nature does not exist. That is why the Yogācāra criticizes both of the ex-
tremes into which his Madhyamaka opponent tends to fall.  
As compared to the Madhyamaka theory of the two truths, one of the 
major contributions of the Yogācāra paradigm of the three natures is to 
introduce the dependent nature to the picture, thereby reinstating a 
more robust worldview against the illusory worldview to which most 
Mādhyamikas are committed. Kenshū (賢洲, ?-1812), a Japanese com-
mentator on the *Buddhadhātu-śāstra, explicitly pointed out that the Ma-
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However, the two truths, as delineated by the beginning teaching [of 
the Mahāyāna], take the ultimate and the conventional truths as 
sharply distinct from each other. The so-called “conventional truth” 
is imagined illusory phenomena, which are conventionally taken to 
be real existents. In conformity with [the usage of] worldly persons, 
the sage calls them the conventional truth. In conformity with his 
own understanding, [however,] the sage calls that which is ultimately 
nonexistent the ultimate truth. These are the two truths as establish-
ed on the basis of the imagined nature.30 
Having learned that the Madhyamaka theory of the two truths is actually 
based on the imagined nature, and therefore commits to an entirely illu-
sory worldview, we can now understand better why the Yogācāra criti-
cism of the two truths focuses exclusively on the conventional truth, and 
especially on issues such as whether designation or linguistic conven-
tions exist or do not. This is because in the Yogācāra system, designation 
or linguistic conventions themselves are of the dependent nature and 
therefore exist, but whatever is designated by linguistic conventions is of 
the imagined nature and does not exist. When Maitreyanātha, Vasuban-
dhu and Yijing characterize the Madhyamaka position by saying, 
“Viewed from the perspective of conventional truth, all things exist,” 
this does not mean that the Madhyamaka sense of the conventional 
truth embraces the dependent nature and takes it as genuinely existent. 
Rather, things are seen as real existents only conventionally, by those 
worldlings who dwell in the imagined nature. Therefore, this characteri-
zation does not contradict the Yogācāra criticism of the Mādhyamikas as 
nihilists, since a commitment to an illusory worldview necessarily leads 
to nihilism.  
Note that Yijing characterizes the Yogācāra view, by contrast, by say-
ing, “What pertains to the ultimate level exists, but what pertains to the 
conventional level does not exist.” Here the “conventional”, which does 




from Takemura, 1977: Appendix, 29. 
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which does exist, refers to the third perfected nature (pariniṣpanna-‌
svabhāva). In the above diagram, this third nature is not explicitly 
indicated. The perfected nature is roughly equivalent to the ultimate 
truth. But unlike the ultimate truth, the perfected nature is not a distinc-
tive layer of reality or perspective. Instead, it is usually defined as the 
dependent nature when it is devoid of the imagined nature, so the per-
fected nature can be the same as the dependent nature when the latter is 
not affected by the imagined nature. In this very subtle way, the Yogā-
cāra theory of the three natures rejects the two-tiered reality suggested 
by the Madhyamaka theory of the two truths, and restores the holistic 
worldview that prevails among the mainstream Buddhist philosophical 
schools. This is probably the reason that the perfected nature cannot be 
separately indicated in the diagram.  
Although the perfected nature is roughly equivalent to the ultimate 
truth, as pointed out by Yijing, there is at least one major difference be-
tween the two, that is, for the Yogācāras what pertains to the ultimate, 
i.e., the perfected nature, exists, but for the Mādhyamikas what pertains 
to the ultimate, i.e., the ultimate truth, does not exist. In Vasubandhu’s 
remarks, and my diagram characterizing them, this point is shown by 
acknowledging that the ultimate truth means first and foremost that self 
and dharma do not exist. The standard Madhyamaka expression of the ul-
timate truth would be that intrinsic nature or self-nature (svabhāva) does 
not exist. Since the Yogācāras still adhere to the positive Ābhidharmika 
usage of self-nature, e.g., in the usage of the terminology of the three 
“natures” (trisvabhāva), they substitute the often negatively colored 
terms “self” and dharma for self-nature. But what they mean is the same: 
imagined illusory things do not exist. The ultimate truth in this sense 
means merely the negation of what does not exist at all, so that the ulti-
mate truth is negative and nonexistent in its very nature. This is why we 
say that for the Mādhyamikas, what pertains to the ultimate does not ex-
ist. But for the Yogācāras, this purely negative characterization of reality 
falls into nihilism. According to Vasubandhu, there does exist one way to 
restore a robust sense of ultimate reality. He thinks that “the emptiness 
of self and of dharmas” is something existent, and he therefore presents a 
positive characterization of the ultimate reality.  
328 Yao  
 
5   A robust sense of emptiness 
Some may wonder what on earth is the difference between these two 
expressions: “Self and dharmas do not exist” and “the emptiness of self 
and dharmas”. And why is one negative, while the other becomes posi-
tive? This has to do with the way the Yogācāras treat “emptiness” as a 
positive concept, and their distinction between the right and wrong un-
derstandings of emptiness. In the Tattvārtha Section of the Bodhisattva-
bhūmi, we see a classical definition of two conceptions of emptiness: 
[This (x)] is empty of that (y), because that (y) does not exist. And this 
(x) is empty, because this (x) does exist.31 In this way, emptiness is 
justified. If everything does not exist, what is empty? Where is it emp-
ty? What is it empty of? For [the notion of] emptiness of exactly this 
(x) itself (eva) of this (x) [itself] is not coherent. Hence, this is a wrong 
understanding of emptiness (durgṛhītā śūnyatā).  
What, then, is the right understanding of emptiness (sugṛhītā śū-
nyatā)?32 One rightly observes that because something (y) does not 
exist in a given place (x), [therefore] this [place] (x) is empty of that 
[thing] (y). Moreover, one knows in accordance with reality that 
whatever remains in this place (x) [apart from that thing (y)] still ex-
ists, and it is something that exists in this place (x). This is called the 
unmistaken understanding (avakrānti) of emptiness, which is in ac-
cordance with reality.33 
-------------------------------------------------- 
31 See Willis’s (1979: 162) translation: “One thing is empty of another because of that 
[other’s] absence and because of the presence of the void thing itself.” 
32 The Derge edition of the Tibetan translation reads stong pa nyid la log par zin pa (= dur-
gṛhītā śūnyatā) (D4037: wi 26b5), and should be corrected by the Peking edition, which 
reads stong pa nyid la legs par zin pa (= sugṛhītā śūnyatā) (Q5538: zhi 31b6). 
33 Takahashi, 2005: 101: yena hi śūnyaṃ tadasadbhāvāt yac ca śūnyaṃ tatsadbhāvāc chūnyatā 
yujyeta || sarvābhāvāc ca kutra kiṃ kena śūnyaṃ bhaviṣyati || na ca tena tasyaiva śūnyatā 
yujyate || tasmād evaṃ durgṛhītā śūnyatā bhavati || kathaṃ ca punaḥ sugṛhītā śūnyatā bha-
vati || yataś ca yad yatra na bhavati tat tena śūnyam iti samanupaśyati | yat punar atrāva-
śiṣṭaṃ bhavati tat sad ihāstīti yathābhūtaṃ prajānāti || iyam ucyate śūnyatāvakrāntir yathā-
bhūtā aviparītā.  
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Here, the Yogācāra advocates the right understanding of emptiness, 
which is actually rooted in our ordinary usage of this term: This (x) is 
empty of that (y), which means that that (y) does not exist in this (x), but 
this (x) does exist. For instance, when we say, “The bottle is empty (of 
water),” we mean that water does not exist in the bottle, but the bottle is 
certainly there. But if the sentence is understood to mean that “x itself is 
empty of x,” then the bottle would not exist either, which would sound 
absurd.  
The Yogācāra definition of the right understanding of emptiness can 
be rephrased in the following way: If something (y) does not exist in 
such-and-such a place (x), one rightly observes this place (x) to be empty 
of that thing (y). Moreover, whatever remains in this place (x), apart 
from that thing (y), still exists; it is known in accordance with reality to 
be something that exists in this place (x). This definition (yad yatra na 
bhavati tat tena śūnyam iti samanupaśyati | yat punar atrāvaśiṣṭaṃ bhavati tat 
sad ihāstīti yathābhūtaṃ prajānāti) is actually a direct quotation from the 
Cūḷasuññata-sutta: iti yaṃ hi kho tattha na hoti, tena taṃ suññaṃ samanupas-
sati, yaṃ pana tattha avasiṭṭhaṃ hoti, taṃ santaṃ idaṃ atthīti pajānāti.34 In-
terestingly, in all their rather extensive discussions on emptiness, the 
Mādhyamikas never referred to this passage, even though it is attributed 
to the Buddha himself and makes more sense in light of our ordinary us-
age of the term “empty”; probably because it would undermine their in-
terpretation of emptiness (see Nagao, 1991: 210). 
Another classical definition of the Yogācāra sense of emptiness is 
found in the Madhyāntavibhāga, a work ascribed to Maitreyanātha and 
transmitted by Asaṅga: “The defining characteristic of emptiness is the 
nonexistence of the duality [of subject and object], and the existence of 
that nonexistence.”35 In their epistemologically oriented project, subject 
and object are regarded as conceptual constructions on the basis of exis-
tent processes in consciousness. The concept of emptiness denies the ex-
-------------------------------------------------- 
34 Majjhima-nikāya III 104. The translation by Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli and Bhikkhu Bodhi (1995: 
966ff) reads: “Thus he regards it as void of what is not there, but as to what remains 
there he understands that which is present thus: ‘This is present.’” 
35 Madhyāntavibhāga I.13ab: dvayābhāvo hy abhāvasya bhāvaḥ śūnyasya lakṣaṇaṃ; see Nagao, 
1964: 22. 
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istence of these conceptual constructions, yet asserts the existence of 
consciousness (vijñāna), thusness (tathatā), or the dharma-realm (dharma-
dhātu). In this respect, emptiness is a positive characterization of reality.  
The Madhyamaka and Yogācāra senses of emptiness were charac-
terized rather neatly by later Tibetan scholars as respectively “self-emp-
tiness” (rang stong, i.e. the emptiness of the thing itself) and “other-emp-
tiness” (gzhan stong, i.e. the emptiness of the thing of anything other 
than it); and the mainstream Tibetan Buddhists considered the former 
(i.e., “x is empty of x”) to be the authentic Madhyamaka understanding 
of emptiness, while condemning the latter (i.e., “x is empty of y”) as he-
retical. For the Yogācāras, however, the Madhyamaka sense of emptiness 
is a wrong understanding of emptiness and leads to nihilism. Their own 
sense of emptiness, i.e. “other-emptiness”, by contrast, is the right un-
derstanding of emptiness, and is capable of retaining the positive cha-
racter of ultimate reality as existent. Therefore, in the above diagram, 
“the emptiness of self and dharmas” is characterized as something exis-
tent, and acts as a distinctive aspect of the ultimate truth.  
6   A holistic worldview 
The four question marks in the brackets in my diagram are a way of cap-
turing the latter part of Vasubandhu’s remarks, where he seems to cast 
doubt on everything he said earlier. Self and dharmas do not exist, and 
yet they are not nonexistents; the emptiness of self and dharmas exists, 
and yet does not exist. The imagined nature is not definitely nonexistent, 
and the dependent nature is not definitely existent either. Everything 
becomes indefinite now. So what is going on here?  
In order to understand this, we need to move on to a passage from the 
*Madhyamakānusāra (Shun zhong lun 順中論 T1565), a work ascribed to 
Asaṅga, and translated into Chinese by Gautama Prajñāruci (Jutan Bore-
liuzhi 瞿曇般若流支, fl. 538-543) in 543. This text is intended to be a 
commentary on Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā, but it does not 
comment on the entire work. Instead it only explains a few important 
verses from this work. After a lengthy introduction to and debate on 
proper methods of argumentation, which takes up more than half of the 
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entire text, Asaṅga jumps to two verses in Chapter 24 that discuss the 
foundational Madhyamaka view of the two truths. He says: 
Proponent: What dharma does not cease? What dharma does not arise? 
Opponent: The ultimate truth. 
Proponent: If this is the case, then there are two truths, i.e., the so-
called conventional and ultimate truths. If there are two truths, then 
your thesis will be proven. 
Opponent: If there is ultimate truth distinct from conventional truth, 
then it proves my thesis. What is wrong with that? As [Nāgārjuna] 
says in the following verses:  
When the Tathāgata teaches the dharma, he relies on the two 
truths: first, conventional truth; second, ultimate truth. Those 
who do not thus know the two kinds of reality (liangzhong shi 
兩種實) [expressed] by the two truths cannot understand the 
real truth (shidi 實諦) in the Buddha’s profound teaching.36  
The opponent here can be identified as a Mādhyamika, who supports 
himself with verses 24.8-9 of the Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā. As we know, 
these two verses are one of the few occasions when Nāgārjuna elaborates 
his theory of the two truths, and they thus hold great importance for the 
Madhyamaka tradition. I have translated them literally, closely following 
the Chinese, which apparently overinterprets these verses by holding 
that there are “two kinds of reality” (liangzhong shi 兩種實) expressed by 






如來說法時  依二諦而說 
  謂一是世諦  二第一義諦 
  若不知此理  二諦兩種實 
  彼於佛深法  則不知實諦; T30:1565.45a13-21. 
 See Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā 24.8-9, La Vallée Poussin, 1913: 492-4:  
dve satye samupāśritya buddhānāṃ dharmadeśanā |  
lokasaṃvṛtisatyaṃ ca satyaṃ ca paramārthaḥ ||  
ye ’nayor na vijānanti vibhāgaṃ satyayor dvayoḥ |  
te tattvaṃ na vijānanti gambhīraṃ buddhaśāsane || 
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proponent in his response, but with slightly different wording, which 
does not imply two levels of reality: “Those who do not know the mean-
ing (yi 義) of the two truths cannot understand the true reality (zhenshi 
真實) of the Buddha’s profound teaching.”37 
Asaṅga goes further, to criticize the two truths by means of a focus on 
non-duality: 
Proponent: Your thesis is pleasing; but so is mine; it is based upon the 
two truths, a doctrine expounded by the Tathāgata. When [the Tathā-
gata] teaches the thusness of dharmas through the two truths, he does 
not destroy non-duality. If there were two [truths], then the conven-
tional thusness of dharmas would be distinguished from the ultimate 
thusness of dharmas. Now, even one thusness of dharmas is inappre-
hensible; how, then, could one apprehend two thusnesses of dharmas? 
If we are to talk about the two truths, we should say that there is no 
ultimate truth other than the conventional truth, because there is 
only one characteristic, which is no characteristic at all.38 
A few lines later, Asaṅga again emphasizes this point of non-duality: 
“Opponent: What is not destroyed by these two truths? Proponent: The 
one characteristic, which is no characteristic and no intrinsic nature.”39 
Finally, he overthrows Nāgārjuna’s claim that the Buddha’s teaching 
relies on the two truths by insisting: “All the Tathāgatas have nothing 
that they rely on; [they] rely upon neither the conventional truth nor 
the ultimate truth. When the Tathāgatas teach, their minds have nothing 
that they rely on. What use is there in saying any more?”40  
-------------------------------------------------- 
37 若人不知此  二諦之義者 





39 問曰：此之二諦，何物不破？答曰：一相，所謂無相、無自體, T30:1565.45b2-4. 
40 一切如來皆無所依。不依世諦，亦復不依第一義諦。如來說法，心無所依。何用多
語？ T30:1565.45b8-10. 
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As we see, Asaṅga tries to maintain a holistic and yet non-dualistic 
worldview, by refusing the Madhyamaka paradigm of two truths, which 
tends to introduce a two-tiered structure into reality. This, as I see it, is 
one of the main agendas of the Yogācāra arguments against the Mādhya-
mikas. In this light, we can now understand that Vasubandhu’s earlier 
remarks are also intended to resist a dualistic tendency towards positing 
existence versus nonexistence, and to maintain a holistic worldview by 
going beyond this dualistic tendency. 
7   Conclusion 
In the wake of the widespread influence of Madhyamaka philosophy, the 
paradigm of the two truths has become a common way of characterizing 
the Buddhist approach to reality. But, as I have shown, this two-tiered 
paradigm contributed to a great extent to the illusory worldview to 
which the majority of Mādhyamikas subscribe.  
One of the goals of the Yogācāra theory of the three natures was to 
improve on this two-tiered paradigm, and to restore a more robust and 
holistic worldview. My study of some scattered sources from Maitreya-
nātha, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu has demonstrated that they criticized 
the Madhyamaka version of two truths doctrine on the basis of the Yogā-
cāra theory of the three natures. I hope that this study will help correct 
some misconceptions concerning the Buddhist approach to reality a-




41 I extend my thanks to members of the workshop series “Indian Buddhist Thought in 
6th-7th Century China”, especially Shoryu Katsura and Michael Radich, for their very 
helpful comments, and for corrections of my translations and my English. This work 
was supported by the Academy of Korean Studies (KSPS) Grant funded by the Korean 
Government (MEST) (AKS-2012-AAZ-104). 
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